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Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted in
Violation of International Law in the
Aftermath of United States v AlvarezMachain
STEPHAN WILSKE AND TERESA SCHILLERt

I. Introduction
On June 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court rendered a landmark
decision that affected not only American jurisprudence, but international law
as well. Besides resolving an immediate dispute about a defendant abducted
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from abroad, United States v Alvarez-Machain' also initiated a worldwide
change in international law. Although the decision was narrowly written, it has
become the template courts use to analyze a range of similar events, which
2
continue to surface.
The international effects of Alvarez-Machain are important not only for
understanding the issues and for predicting outcomes for subsequent cases, but
also for studying the evolution of international law. Alvarez-Machain served as
the impetus for the United States' decision to sign an agreement with Mexico,
the Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions of November 23, 1994, that
expressly provides for the prompt return of an abductee and strips domestic
courts of jurisdiction to try such an abductee.3 In so doing, the agreement
effectively overrules the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in AlvarezMachain. Even more interesting is the influence of Alvarez-Machain on the
evolution of a contrary rule of customary international law. This evolution was
largely provoked by strong opposition from foreign states and international
bodies to the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning. The rule of customary international law has been established even faster than the U.S.-Mexican treaty
amendment, which has not yet entered into force. 4 The boundaries of such a
new rule of customary international law (the existence of which is established
in this Article) will surely be tested as cases of international abductions
continue to arise; the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal may well provide the
forum for such a test.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that federal courts have
jurisdiction over a defendant abducted from abroad under the auspices of
governmental authority, despite the existence of an extradition treaty with the
state from which he was abducted.' Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, allegedly administered stimulants to an American drug enforcement agent to keep him awake while he was tortured by drug dealers
who had captured and eventually murdered him. 6 When informal negotiations

1. United States v Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992).
2. Tim Weiner, A Global Manhunt Ends, NY Times 5 4 at 2 (June 22, 1997); Peter
Hecht and Denny Walsh, Kidnap of Mexican Doctor Now Hurts U.S.: Costa Rica Might
Not Return Carpenter, Sacramento Bee Al (Apr 21, 1994); John J. Fialka, Customs
Service's "Stings" to Curtail Arms Sales Draw Blood (Its Own) as Cases Collapse in
Court, Wall St J A12 (Mar 18, 1994); Michael Isikoff, U.S. Customs "Sting" Nets
Cypriot, Angers Bahamas, Wash Post A2 (Feb 5, 1993).
3. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, signed Nov 23, 1994, United StatesMexico, in Michael Abbell and Bruno A. Ristau, 5 International Judicial Assistance
(Criminal) Extradition A-676.3 (Supp 1995). For the necessity of such a provision, see
Easing Border Tensions, Sacramento Bee A6 (Nov 30, 1994) ("In most bilateral relation-

ships such a provision would hardly be necessary.").
4. According to its Article 9, the treaty is subject to ratification. Treaty to Prohibit
Transborder Abductions, Art 9 (cited in note 3). However, it has not yet been submitted
to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
5. 504 US at 670.
6. Id at 657. See also Don J. DeBenedictis, Scant Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor,
79 ABAJ 22 (1993). After his release, Alvarez-Machain sued the DEA and its agents.
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for the extradition of Alvarez-Machain failed, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) offered a reward for turning him over to officials in the United
States; eventually, the DEA had him kidnapped.7
Despite Alvarez-Machain's ultimate acquittal for lack of evidence,' the
Supreme Court's decision caused an international outcry which has not yet
died away. Media commentary, even in the United States, condemned the
decision as condoning a lawless policy.' Egyptian," Moroccan," and even
Chinese media,"2 eager to discuss a human rights issue other than the
Tienanmen massacre, joined the chorus of critics. The decision also drew the
attention of the international legal community. It was heavily criticized all over
the world.1" This reaction has "signal[ed] a decline in tolerance for covert

Alvarez-Machain, 10 F 3d 696, 698 (9th Cir 1996).
7. United States v Caro-Quintero, 745 F Supp 599, 602-03 (C D Cal 1990), affd as
United States v Alvarez-Machain, 946 F2d 1466 (9th Cir 1991), rev'd 504 US 655 (1992).
8. Partial Transcript, United States v Caro Quintero, et al, No CR-87-422-(G)-ER
(CD Cal Dec 14, 1992) reproduced in Secretaria De Relaciones Exteriores, 2 Limits to
National Jurisdiction 184 (Mexico 1993).
9. Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After AlvarezMacbain, 45 Stan L Rev 939, 941-42 nn 10-16 (1993).
10. Heman De J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping Is Legal, 20 Hastings

Const L Q 833, 836 (1993).
11. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts: Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention By Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 Wm and Mary L Rev 1401 (1996).
12. China Comments on US Affairs; Beijing Radio Condemns U.S. Court Ruling on
Foreign Suspects, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (June 24, 1992).
13. Neville Botha, Extradition v. Kidnapping: One Giant Leap Backwards-United
States v. Alvarez-Macbain, 19 S African Yrbk of Ind L 219 (1994); Faizan Mustafa,
United States v. Alvarez-Macbain-A Critique, Civ & MI L J 36 (1992) (New Delhi,
India); S. Farinelli, Panorama: Trattati di estradizione e norme generali in tema di forcible
abduction secondo la Corte suprema degli Stati Uniti, 75 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale
1037 (1992) (Italy); Betsy Baker & Volker R6ben, To Abduct or To Extradite: Does a
Treaty Beg the Question?, 53 Zeitschrift fdr auslndisches 6ffentliches Recht und
V6lkerrecht 657 (1993) (Germany); Hartmut A. Grams, Jurisdiktion im Anscblug an die
Ergreifung eigener Staatsangehrigerim Ausland. Male captus bene iudicatus or ex iniuria
ius non oritur?, Juristische Ausbildung 65 (1994) (Germany); Christopher B. Kuner, Zur
vdlkerrecbtswidrigen Entfiibrung nacb US-amerikaniscbem Recbt, 20 Europiiische
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1 (1993) (Germany); Dirk Schlimm, Der Strafprozef§ gegen eine im
Ausland entfhibrte Person-Anmerkung zur Entscbeidung des United States Supreme Court
Rechtspolitik 262 (1993)
im Fall United States v. Alvarez-Macbain, 26 Zeitschrift fiir
(Germany); Brigitte Stem, L'extraterritorialitgrevisitie: 0?1 ilest question des affaires
Alvarez-Macbain, Pate de bois et de quelques autres, 38 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 239 (1992) (France); Rosemary Rayfuse, International Abduction and the
United States Supreme Court: The Law of the Jungle Reigns, 42 Intl & Comp L Q 882
(1993) (United Kingdom); 'George Sullivan, et al, US Supreme Court: An Inconsistent
International Policy, 23 Anglo-Am L Rev 311 (1994) (United Kingdom); Carlos D.
Esp6sito, Male captus, bene detentus: A pr6posito de la sentencia del tribuno supremo de
Estados Unidos en el caso Alvarez-Macbain, 2 Estudios de Jurisprudencia 7 (Mar-Apr
1993) (Spain); Francisco Villagran Kramer, El caso Alvarez Machain a la luz de la
jurisprudencia y la doctrina internacional, 45 Revista Espafiola de Derecho Internacional
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coercive activities across sovereign borders generally and not just a particular
low point in U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations." 4
The interest generated by the Alvarez-Machain decision was remarkable
given the narrow scope of the Supreme Court's holding. The Court did not
find that there exists a "right to kidnap," as some newspapers15 and even
commentators 16 erroneously reported. The majority simply held that AlvarezMachain's abduction did not violate the Extradition Treaty between Mexico
and the United States. 7 This holding was crucial to the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction in the case. The question of jurisdiction hinges upon the application of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, which states that, as a matter of principle, a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is not defeated by a defendant's
unlawful importation into the court's jurisdiction. 8 However, two exceptions
to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine have developed. The first exception requires a court
to divest itself of jurisdiction over the defendant where the defendant establishes governmental conduct "of a most shocking and outrageous character." 9

541 (1993) (Spain); Alonso G6mez-Robledo Verduzco, United States vs. Alvarez Machain,

5 Cuadernos Constitucionales M6xico-Centroam6rica (1993) (Mexico); John Murphy and
Jon Michael Dumont, The Rendition of International Criminals: Hard Cases Make Bad

Law, Festkrift till Jacob W.F. Sundberg 171 (juristf6rlaget, 1993) (Sweden); Otto Lagodny,
Legally Protected Interests of the Abducted Alleged Offender, 27 Israel L Rev 339 (1993)
14. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Covert Action, 20 Yale J Intl L 419, 422 (1995).
15. High Court Backs Seizing Foreigner for Trial in U.S., NY Times Al (June 16,
1992). Compare U.S. Promises Not to Abduct Mexicans, Wash Post A34 (July 2, 1992)

("The court said Alvarez Machain's kidnapping was legal because it was not expressly
prohibited by the bilateral extradition treaty.").
16. Candace R. Somers, United States v. Alvarez-Macbain: Extradition and the Right
to Abduct, 18 NCJ Intl L & Comm Reg 213 (1992); Jana Logan, Kidnap? Sure, Says the
Court, 1 San Diego Just J 253 (1993); Heidi L. Goebel, United States v. Alvarez-Macbain:
The Supreme Court's Approval of the Abduction of Foreign Nationals, 25 U Tol L Rev
297 (1994).
17. Extradition Treaty, [1980] 31 UST 5059 (1978).

18. In Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436 (1886), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed for the
first time the issue of a defendant brought before a court by way of a forcible abduction
from abroad. Frederick Ker had been tried and convicted in an Illinois court for larceny;
he managed to escape to Peru. A Pinkerton agent, Henry Julian, was sent to Lima with

the proper warrant to demand Ker by virtue of the extradition treaty between Peru and
the United States. The Court put emphasis on the fact that Julian disdained reliance on
the treaty processes, and instead forcibly kidnapped Ker and brought him to the United
States. In fact, when the agent arrived in Peru, he found Lima under military occupation
by Chilean forces. The remnants of Peru's government had fled to the mountains.
Therefore, Julian secured the consent of the commander of the Chilean forces. See Charles
Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am J Intl L 678 (1953). The political situation in
Peru was not mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion. There is also some ambiguity as
to whether the court deemed Ker's "abductor" a government agent or a private party.
Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519 (1952) is a domestic kidnapping case. Therefore, it
is inappropriate to cite this case as precedent for international kidnapping cases.
19. Lujan v Gengler, 510 F2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir 1975). This case limited United
States v Toscanino, 500 F2d 267 (2d Cir 1974), by declaring that mere forcible kidnapping, without evidence of torture or other such barbarous conduct, does not rise to the
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The Ninth Circuit further explained that before jurisdiction will be divested, a
defendant must make "a strong showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarities inflicted upon him by persons who can be characterized as paid agents of
the United States."2" Alvarez-Machain's allegations of mistreatment, however,
even if taken as true, did not constitute acts of such barbarism as to be
covered by this exception.21
The other exception which might have threatened the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction is known as the Rauscher exception. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v Rauscher

and Cook v United States,'2

lower courts and commentators have assumed that American courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant abducted by the government in violation
of a treaty obligation.24 Thus, by finding that there was no violation of the
Mexican-American extradition treaty in Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court

level of "shocking the conscience."
20. United States v Lovato, 520 F2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir 1975) (per curiam); see also
United States v Valot, 625 F2d 308, 310 (9th Cir 1980) (quoting Lujan, 510 F2d at 65-

66) (cited in note 19) (stating that dismissal of an indictment is warranted only where a
defendant demonstrates governmental misconduct "of the most shocking and outrageous
kind-).
21. Caro-Quintero, 745 F Supp at 605.
22. United States v Rauscher, 119 US 407, 430 (1886). Rauscher, decided the same
day as Ker, held that the doctrine of specialty, read into the treaty in question, barred
Rauscher's arrest or trial for other offenses "until a reasonable time and opportunity have
been given him . . . to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly
taken." A protest registered by the relevant country in this case, Great Britain, was not
mentioned in the decision.
23. Cook v United States, 288 US 102 (1933). In Cook, the Court held that American
courts lacked jurisdiction over a boat seized beyond the territorial limits authorized by a
treaty with Great Britain.
24. See United States v Ferris, 19 F2d 925 (N D Cal 1927); United States v
Schouweiler, 19 F2d 38 (S D Cal 1927). Commentators have been critical about a
distinction between treaty violations, to which the Rauscher exception applies, and
violations of customary international law, which are subject to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
These commentators have considered the distinction to be artificial and without merit.
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 71
(Oxford 1994); Keith Highet, et al, International Decisions, 86 Am J Intl L 811, 815
(1992); William C. Birkett, Comment, Cracks in the Foundation of ExtraterritorialLaw
Enforcement-A Challenge to Basic Judicial Doctrines, 15 SIU L J 599, 615 n 112 (1991);
John M. Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial, 42 U Miami L Rev 447, 449 n 11 (1987); Eleni Sakellar,
Acquisition of Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants by Forcible Abduction: Strict
Adherence to Ker-Frisbie Frustrates United States Foreign Policy and Obligations, 2 ASILS
Intl L J 1, 38-40 (1978); Fred Pedersen, Note, Due Process Rights of Foreign National
Defendants Abducted from Native Country by Federal Agents, 7 U Tol L Rev 723, 733
(1976); Thomas H. Spansler, International Kidnapping, 5 Intl Law 27, 4546 (1971);
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought from a
Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 Ind L J 427, 442 (1957);
Edwin D. Dickinson, JurisdictionFollowing Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International
Law, 28 Am J Intl L 231, 238 (1934).
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was able to ignore the Rauscher exception and exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant. Both the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and its exceptions are creations of national law that are not necessarily based upon international law.
The more interesting question, whether customary international law
prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction over Alvarez-Machain, was not before
the Court.2" Even under U.S. law, the answer to this question could have
been decisive. The Supreme Court has long held that customary international
law is incorporated into the law of the United States.26 However, if a branch
of the United States government abrogates a provision of customary international law, American courts will cease to give the custom domestic effect.2 In
an oft-quoted passage from The Paquete Habana, a relevant case, Justice Gray
enunciated these principles:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations.28
On remand, Alvarez-Machain did, in fact, raise an independent defense
based on customary international law. The Ninth Circuit, however, explained
that "[tio the extent that customary international law may arguably provide a
basis for an exception to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, the exception has been
recognized only in a situation in which the government's conduct was outrageous." 9 This decision was disappointing when compared with the thoroughly drafted opinion on appeal." The Ninth Circuit failed to explain why it did

25. During the oral argument, Justice O'Connor asked Alvarez-Machain's counsel the
following question: "Well, if we were to conclude the treaty doesn't cover this, do you
fall back on some violation of international law?" Mr. Hoffman: "Justice O'Connor, there
were alternative grounds for affirmance that were presented to the Ninth Circuit and the
courts below. Those have not been ruled upon either by the district court or the Ninth
Circuit and presumably those would be litigated if this Court finds that there is no provision in the treaty." United States v Alvarez-Machain, No 91-712, 1992 WL 687303 at
*34-35 (April 1, 1992).

26. See The Nereide, 13 US 388, 423 (1815) (noting that in the absence of a congressional act, "the court is bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of the
land."); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900).

27. Garcia-Mirv Meese, 788 F2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir 1986). See also Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law S 115 n 3 (1986) (hereinafter, "Restatement of Foreign
Relations"); Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary

International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional? 80 Nw U L Rev 321 (1985).
28. 175 US at 700.
29. United States v Alvarez-Machain, 971 F2d 310, 311 (9th Cir 1992).

30. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain in United States v Alvarez-Machain, 946 F2d 1466 (9th Cir
1991), relying on its prior decision in United States v Verdigo-Urquidez, 939 F2d 1341

(9th Cir 1991).

1998]

Jurisdiction Over Persons Abducted 211

not even discuss the question of whether other exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine had to be applied under customary international law, and thus,
following Paquete Habana, under U.S. law as well.
It is possible that the Ninth Circuit saw a different ruling precluded by a
dictum of the Supreme Court opinion in United States v Alvarez-Machain.
After conceding that the abduction "may be in violation of international law
principles," the majority stated that, nonetheless, "the decision of whether
respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty,
is a matter for the Executive Branch." 31 However, this dictum suggesting that
the executive branch is solely responsible for remedying violations of customary international law runs contrary to the language in Paquete Habana, and
does not exonerate future courts from making an examination of relevant
customary international law. Such an examination will become even more
important in the future given that Alvarez-Machain has had repercussions in
the international community that have changed the relevant rules of customary
international law.
The following analysis of state practice in matters of international statesponsored kidnapping updates former studies." The first section provides an
outline of sources and evidence of customary international law, and examines
the scant practice of international organizations. The second part concentrates
on recent decisions by foreign courts. The third section analyzes reactions by
individual governments in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain which might
constitute opinio juris. This general evaluation of state practice attempts to
show that customary international law precludes a state from exercising
jurisdiction over persons whom its agents have abducted in violation of
international law. Furthermore, such a rule does not depend upon the existence
of an extradition treaty between the abducting state and the state whose
territorial sovereignty is violated.
For purposes of this Article, an abduction in violation of international law
will be defined as a seizure of a person by force against the will of the
territorial sovereign without justification under international law.33 The seizure

31. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US at 669.
32. See, for example, Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation
of International Law, 29 British Yrbk Intl L 265 (1952); Manuel R. Garcfa-Mora,
Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force
or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 Ind L J 427 (1957); Bartholom6 de Schutter, Com-

petence of the National Judiciary Power in Case the Accused Has Been Unlawfully
Brought within the National Frontiers, 1 Revue Beige de Droit International 88 (1965);
Elmar F. Bauer, Die vilkerrechtswidrige Entfiihrung (Duncker Humblot 1968); Vincent
Coussirat-Coustre & Pierre-Michel Eisemann, L'Enl~vement des Personnes Privg et le
Droit International, 76 RGDIP 346 (1972).
33. An international abduction can be justified under Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, for example, in the case of legitimate self-defense. Further, it might be
sanctioned by the Security Council of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the
Charter. It is less certain whether such abductions might be justified under the legal
doctrines of self-help or humanitarian intervention or under the customary law of self-de-
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has to be performed by persons whose actions can be attributed to a state.
Thus, seizures by private parties without participation of the state are not a
subject of this article.
II. Customary International Law
In the absence of international conventions governing a certain subject,
customary law is the most important source of international law. Article 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which enumerates the
sources of international law, refers in subsection (b) to "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Customary international
law, therefore, results from a general and consistent practice which states
follow out of a sense of legal obligation. 3 4 Evidence that such a custom exists
can be found only by examining the practice of states. Such evidence will
obviously be very diverse. There are multifarious occasions on which persons
who act or speak in the name of the state perform acts or make declarations
which either express or imply some view on a matter of international law. Any
such act or declaration may constitute evidence that a custom, and hence, a
rule of international law, does or does not exist, but of course, the evidentiary
weight accorded to the act or declaration will be determined only after
considering the relevant occasion and circumstances."5 Customary rules crystallize from usages or practices which have evolved under the following three
36
sets of circumstances.
1. Diplomatic relations between states-Acts or declarations by
representatives of states, press releases, or official statements by governments may all constitute evidence of practices followed by states.
2. Practice of international organizations-The practice of international organizations, whether by conduct or declaration, may lead to the

fense (beyond Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations). Compare Michael J.
Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86
Am J Intl L 746 (1992); Matthew L. Guzman, International Kidnaping or Justifiable
Seizure?, 17 SIU L J 317 (1992); Theodore C. Jonas, International "Fugitive Snatching"
in U.S. Law: Two Views from Opposite Ends of the Eighties, 24 Cornell Intl L J 521
(1991); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 Iowa
L Rev 325 (1967); Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials

of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 St John's L Rev 551 (1993); Aaron
Schwabach and S.A. Patchett, Doctrine or Dictum: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and Official
Abductions Which Breach InternationalLaw, 25 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 19 (1993); Scott
S. Evans, InternationalKidnapping in a Violent World: Where the United States Ought to
Draw the Line, 137 Milit L Rev 187 (1992); Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 Colum J Transnatl L 513 (1992).
34. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands),
1969 Intl Ct Justice 3, 43 (Feb 20); Restatement of Foreign Relations 5 102(2) (1986).
35. J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 61 (5th ed 1955).
36. I.A. Shearer, Starke's International Law 32 (11th ed 1994).
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development of customary rules of international law concerning their
status, or their powers and responsibilities.
3. State laws, state courts decisions, and state administrativepractices-A concurrence, although not necessarily a parallelism, of state laws
or of judicial decisions of state courts or state administrative practices
may indicate so wide an adoption of similar rules as to suggest the
general recognition of a broad principle of law. 8
The means of proving a rule of customary international law are described by
the Restatement of Foreign Relations § 103(2) as follows:
In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial
weight is accorded to
(a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral
tribunals;
(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals;
(c) the writings of scholars;
(d) pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of
international law, when such pronouncements are not seriously challenged by other states.
This Section examines all of these sources of customary international law
in an attempt to identify the prevailing concurrence of nations on the issue of
law raised by Alvarez-Machain.

A. OPINIONS OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES
There are no cases from international judicial or arbitral tribunals which
directly focus on the question of jurisdiction over kidnapped persons. Both
Colunje v United States39 and The Savarkar Case" concentrated on the question of restitution to a person whose custody was obtained by irregular means,
but not by forcible abduction. Although the Stockg case involved allegations of
a forcible abduction, the European Court of Human Rights avoided a decision
on the merits by holding that a kidnapping had not been proven. 1

37. Compare Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations, 1949 Intl Ct Justice 174 (1949).

38. The Scotia, 81 US 170, 188 (1871).
39. Guillermo Colunje (Panama) v United States, 6 RIAA 342 (United States-Panama
General Claims Commission 1933). For a comment on the case, see Bert L. Hunt, The

United States-Panama General Claims Commission, 28 Am J Intl L 61, 73 (1934).
40. The Savarkar Case (Great Britain v France), 11 RIAA 243 (Arbitral Appointed to
Decide the Case of Savarkar 1911); see also Karl Doehring, Savarkar Case, in Rudolph

Bernhardt, ed, Encyclopedia of Public InternationalLaw 252-54 (North Holland 1981).

41. Affaire Stocki c Ripublique Fod&ale d'Allemagne, Decision of 19 March 1991, No
28/1989/188/248, Publications de la Cour europ6ne des Droits de l'Homme, S6ie A, Vol

199.
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1. Inter-American Juridical Committee
The Alvarez-Machain decision, however, was the subject of a juridical
opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee. 42 At the request of the
presidents of the Cono Sur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay,
and Uruguay), the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States
("OAS") requested the opinion in a resolution of July 15, 1992. 43 In a common
statement made June 26, 1992, the Presidents expressed their concern about the
consequences of the Alvarez-Machain decision and decided to petition the
Permanent Council of the OAS to request the Inter-American Juridical Committee to issue an opinion about the legality of this ruling. 4
The Committee's opinion, issued on August 15, 1992, was approved by nine
votes in favor and one abstention, Seymour J. Rubin of the United States. The
Committee found that the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court decision was
contrary to the norms of international law because, among other things,
by affirming the jurisdiction of the United States of America to try Mexican
citizen Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was brought by force from his
country of origin, the decision ignores the obligation of the United States
to return5 Alvarez to the country from whose jurisdiction he was kid4
napped.
One might dispute, as the Committee's one abstaining member did, whether the
Inter-American Juridical Committee really has the authority under Articles 104
and 105 of the OAS Charter to issue an opinion directly addressing the validity
of a Member State's high court. 4 Regardless of the Committee's power to issue
such an opinion, it is clear that the opinion has no binding effect. The opinion
merely asserts its conclusions without referring to any specific sources which
might support or justify them. Nevertheless, the opinion should be accorded
some evidentiary weight in determining what is to be considered customary
international law because the members of the Inter-American Juridical Committee are international law experts of various Member States.

42. Kidnapping Suspects Abroad, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 267 (1992)
(hereinafter, "Kidnapping Suspects Abroad"). The opinion is also published in 13 Hum Rts
L J 395 (1992) and 4 Crim L F 119 (1993).
43. Reprinted in 13 Hum Rts L J 395 (1992).
44. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 2 Limits to National Jurisdiction: Documents
and Judicial Resolutions on the Alvarez Machain Case 7 (1993) ("Limits H").
45. Kidnapping Suspects Abroad at 269 (cited in note 42).
46. See Explanation of Vote by Dr. Seymour J. Rubin, Kidnapping Suspects Abroad at
284-85 (cited in note 42).
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2. Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community
The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community
("CARICOM"), 7 the Community's supreme authority, issued the following
statement on July 2, 1992 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago:
The Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community take note of the
recent decision of the US Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case and
the circumstances leading up to that decision. The Heads of Government
emphatically reject the notion that any State may seek to enforce its
domestic law by means of abduction of persons from the territory of
another sovereign state with the intention to bring them within its jurisdiction in order to stand trial on criminal charges.
Such actions constitute a violation of the most fundamental principles
of international law and must be unequivocally condemned by the international community."
Even though the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM is a
political and not a judicial body, the statement issued nevertheless reflects the
opinio juris of the organization and the participating governments.
The opinions of these international bodies reflect at least some evidence that
it is contrary to a rule of customary international law for a court to exercise
jhrisdiction over a person kidnapped from a foreign state.
B. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS OF NATIONAL JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
Further evidence of customary international law regarding jurisdiction over
persons kidnapped from abroad can be found by looking to judgments and
opinions of national judicial tribunals. It must be kept in mind, however, that in
determining the existence of and applying a rule of customary international law,
not only is the court's nonexercise of jurisdiction over abductees important, but
as important is the court's nonexercise of jurisdiction over the defendant out of
a sense of legal obligation.
1. England
England, like the United States, has traditionally been perceived as following
the rule of male captus, bene detentus (wrongfully caught, legally detained),
based on precedent of the early 19th century. In Ex parte Susannah Scott, Chief
Justice Lord Tenderden held:

47. CARICOM was founded in 1973 by agreement of Commonwealth Caribbean
Heads of Government, on the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. It succeeded the
Caribbean Free Trade Association ("Carifta"), established in 1968. Member countries of
CARICOM are Antigua and Barbados, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The British Virgin Islands and the Turks and
Caicos Islands are associate members.
48. Limits II at 13 (cited in note 44).
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The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime
is found in this country, it is the duty of the court to take care that such a
party shall be amenable to justice, or whether we are to consider the
circumstances under which she was brought here. I thought, and still
continue to think, that we cannot inquire into them.49
The U.S. Supreme Court in Ker v Illinois considered Scott to be one of the
"authorities of highest respectability." s° As in Alvarez-Machain, the court in
Scott failed to consider customary international law in reaching its decision.
Some critics are convinced that the Scott court's decision would have been
different had it examined customary international law. s"
It is not obvious that Scott stands for the proposition that a court can
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant abducted from a foreign state without the
consent of that state. The circumstances were somewhat dubious: although
Susannah Scott was arrested by English police in Brussels, it is not clear whether
or not consent was ever given by the territorial sovereign, the Netherlands in
those times. No Dutch protest to the arrest was reported in the case. If Dutch
authorities had indeed consented to the arrest on Dutch soil by English police,
then no violation of Dutch sovereignty would have occurred. An absence of
protest could be interpreted as an indication of consent. If the English court
indeed interpreted Dutch silence as consent to the arrest, Scott cannot be considered precedent for permissible jurisdiction over persons abducted in violation
of international law.
There is some evidence that the court found the absence of protest by the
territorial sovereign to be significant. The Scott opinion even contained a
warning to English law enforcement agents who might be tempted to act without
the sovereign's consent:
[T]here is little danger that a foreign country would allow such an arrest,
and if the party making it is guilty of misconduct, the verdict of a jury will
teach him [the English officer] not to repeat it. 2
The court seems incredulous that consent was not given in Scott. In any event,
its warning must have fallen on fertile ground, because there were no subsequent
cases in which English agents kidnapped a person from abroad without the
consent of the territorial sovereign. In all of the following cases, consent was
sought and given.

49. Ex parte Susannah Scott, 109 Eng Rep 166 (KB 1829).

50. 119 US at 444.
51. Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure of Persons by States, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed,

International Terrorism and Political Crimes 336, 339 (Charles C. Thomas 1975).
52. 109 Eng Rep at 167.
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In Ex parte Elliott, 3 with the help of Belgian police officers, a British
deserter was arrested by British police in Belgium and brought to England. The
extraterritorial arrest was presumed to be in accordance with international law
because of the participation of the Belgian officers. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the male captus, bene detentus rule, first pronounced in Scott, by not
inquiring into the circumstances of the arrest.
In Ex parte Mackeson, however, the noninquiry rule was seriously questioned. Mackeson, a British citizen wanted on fraud charges, was returned from
Zimbabwe to England under a deportation order. Lord Chief Justice Lane stated:
[The mere fact that his arrival might have been procured by illegality did
not in any way oust the jurisdiction of the Court; nevertheless, since the
applicant had been removed from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by unlawful means,
i.e. by a deportation order in the guise of extradition, he had in fact been
brought to the United Kingdom by unlawful means. Thus, the Divisional
Court would, in its discretion, grant the application for prohibition and
discharge the applicant. s4
No violation of international law was pleaded in Mackeson. Nonetheless, the
court felt it necessary to put a stop to what it perceived to be overzealousness on
the part of English police dealing with suspects abroad. In this case, an attempt
to achieve extradition "by the back door" was enough to throw the non-inquiry
rule into question."s
The old maxim of male captus, bene detentus was revived, however, in Ex
parte Driver," another case in which the extradition procedure was circumvented by both states involved. The court in Driver did not feel bound by Mackeson
and Healy because both cases were considered to have been decided per incuriam
(through inadvertence)., 7 Therefore, inconsistent precedents existed under

53. Regina v Officer Commanding Depot Battalion (Ex parte Elliott), 1 All ER 373
(KB 1949).
54. Regina v Bow Street Magistrates (Ex parte Mackeson), 75 Crim App 24 (1981).
55. Judge Davies in Mackeson even remarked, "[In my view the principles to be
applied to a case of this nature are now well established." Id at 34. Shortly after
Mackeson, this approach was followed by Regina v Guildford Magistrates' Court (Ex
parte Healy), 1 WLR 108, 113 (1983) ("As I say, if this question is to be raised in future
cases the proper procedure is to use that in Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrates, Ex Parte
Mackeson.").

56. Regina v Plymouth Magistrates' Court and others (Ex parte Driver), 2 All ER 681
(QB 1985).
57. Id at 698 ("[I]t appears to me that, in the absence of fuller reference to the
authorities which have been drawn to the attention of this court, Mackeson's case, so far
as the existence of a discretion is concerned, can be said to be a decision per incuriam
[citations omitted]. It must also follow that Ex p. Healy . . .which followed Mackeson's
case, was also decided per incuriam in so far as the court accepted the existence of a
discretion in the court."). However, this reasoning was strongly rejected by legal scholars.
See Andrew L.-T. Choo, The Consequences of Illegal Extradition, [1992] Crim L R 492
("This conclusion was reached by a questionable application of the doctrine of stare
decisis and without any consideration of issues of principle."); G. Ossman, The Doctrine
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English law with respect to the question of jurisdiction over defendants illegally
brought into the country. It remained unclear how English courts should resolve
the conflict between Mackeson and Driver.8
The House of Lords finally resolved the conflict in Ex Parte Bennett. 9 By
a vote of four to one, the Law Lords found that English courts have the discretion to stay the trial of a criminal defendant where English police have disregarded the protections of formal extradition and have had a defendant seized
abroad by illegal means."0 The defendant Bennett, located in South Africa, was
wanted in England on fraud charges. There was no extradition treaty in force
with South Africa at the time, but England's 1989 Extradition Act allowed
special arrangements for extradition to be made by certificate of the Secretary of
State, with protections against double jeopardy, political offenses, and trial of
other unreviewed offenses. The English police, however, took a shortcut by
making an informal arrangement with their South African police colleagues. The
defendant claimed that he was arrested by South African police, forced onto a
flight for New Zealand by way of Taipei, intercepted at Taipei by South African
police, packed back onto a flight to South Africa, and then-in disdain of an
order of the South African Supreme Court-forcibly placed on a flight from
Johannesburg to Heathrow.6' In making their decision, the Law Lords did not
consider whether there was protest or acquiescence by Taiwanese and South
African authorities. Nor did they rely on evidence of any physical brutality. Lord
Bridge of Harwich, after discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in Alvarez-Machain,
condemningly concluded:
To hold that the court may turn a blind eye to executive lawlessness
beyond the frontiers of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and
unacceptable view.62
Lord Lowry, who obviously had the scenario from Alvarez-Machain in mind,
gave a clear warning:

of Abuse of Process of the Court: Its Impact on the Principles of Extradition Without A
Conventional Obligation and of Specialty, 16 (1) Liverpool L R 73 (1994) ("There are
good grounds for holding that the judgment is self-contradictory.").
58. Regina v Bateman and Cooper, 1989 Crim L Rev 590 (CA Feb 3, 1989); Regina
v Gilmore, 1992 Crim L Rev 67 (CA Aug 19, 1991) ("It was an open question whether
the court had power to enquire into the circumstances in which a person was found in
the jurisdiction for the purpose of refusing to try him."). The Court of Appeals twice had
the opportunity to resolve the conflict between Mackeson and Driver but refused to do so.
Bateman, 1989 Crim L Rev at 591 ("It was not necessary to resolve the conflict in the
instant case because there was no evidence that the deportation was a disguised extradition.").
59. Regina v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court (Ex Parte Bennett), 3 All ER 138
(HL 1993).

60. Id at 139c.
61. Id at 141j.
62. Id at 155g.
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If British officialdom at any level has participated in or encouraged the
kidnapping, it seems to represent a grave contravention of international
law, the comity of nations and the rule of law generally if our courts allow
themselves to be used by the executive to try an offence which the courts
would not be dealing with if the rule of law had prevailed.'3
The Lords justified their decision as an exercise of supervisory power. According
to Bennett, a forcible abduction does not necessarily bar jurisdiction. Rather, the
trial court has the discretion to decline jurisdiction in such a case, meaning that
the House of Lords does not consider a decline of jurisdiction to be required in
all cases. Nonetheless, under the Law Lords' articulation of the doctrine, it is
likely that a forcible abduction would lead, in almost every case, to a stay of the
trial."4
Thus, English courts inquire into the circumstances of an arrest abroad. They
do so under requirements of national law which are interpreted, however, so as
to give special emphasis to internati6nal law. Therefore, the English approach, at
least in part, reflects a sense of legal obligation."'
2. South Africa
The South African Supreme Court made an even more remarkable switch in
its February 26, 1991 decision in State v Ebrabim.6' For decades, South African
courts had followed the maxim of male captus, bene detentus.6 ' Ebrahim was

abducted by South African police from Swaziland. Although there was an
extradition treaty between South Africa and Swaziland, 68 no formal request for
extradition was lodged. Swaziland also failed to file a complaint against the

63. Id at 163c.
64. Compare Andrew L.-T. Choo, InternationalKidnapping, Disguised Extradition and
Abuse of Process, 57 Mod L Rev 626, 632 (1994) ("One wonders how willing a court
would be to stay a prosecution for mass murder on the basis that the English police circumvented the relevant extradition procedures in securing the return of the accused to
England. Yet a stay is precisely what Lord Griffiths would seem to require even in this
situation.").
65. See Vaughan Lowe, Circumventing Extradition Procedures is an Abuse of Process,
1993 Cambridge L J 371, 373 ("[Bennett] demonstrates a determination to make the
processes of English law conform to principles of international law.").
66. 1991 (2) SALR 553 (alternate translation in 31 Intl Legal Mat 888 (1992)). Justice
Stevens referred to this decision in his dissenting opinion in United States v AlvarezMacbain, 504 US at 687. Compare Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law
of Nations, 104 Yale L J 39, 42 (1994) ("Ironically, in its construction of the treaty, the
Supreme Court could have benefited from the example of the highest court of South
Africa, which recently dismissed the prosecution of a person kidnapped from a neighboring
country.").
67. Regina v Robertson, 1912 SALR 10 (Transvaal); Abrahams v Minister of Justice,
1963 (4) SALR 542 (Cape); Ndhlovu v Minister of Justice, 68 ILR 7 (Natal 1976); Nduli
v Minister of Justice, 69 ILR 145 (S Ct App Div 1977).
68. Rika Pretorius, Delictual Compensation for Abduction in Foreign Territory, 18 S
African Yrbk Intl L 142, 145 (1992-93).
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violation of its sovereignty after the seizure of Ebrahim from its territory. When
Ebrahim complained that he had been abducted from Swaziland, one of the
police officers who interrogated him remarked that his alleged kidnapping was
"purely of academic interest."69 This view was apparently shared by the lower
court which upheld the South African courts' jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court reversed, however, concluding that a South African court
has no jurisdiction to try a person abducted from foreign territory by the
state.7 This means that courts must decline jurisdiction in these cases. The
court did not reach the question of international law because it based its opinion
on principles of Roman-Dutch common law which include the fundamental legal
principles of (1) the necessity to protect and promote human rights, (2) the
importance of maintaining good international relations, and (3) a healthy
administration of justice.72 The court insisted that, when the state is involved in
a judicial process, it must approach the courts with clean hands, which is not the
case when it has abducted a person from foreign territory.73 Ebrahim received
a windfall from the South African Supreme Court's change in doctrine: not only
did the Court reverse jurisdiction, but in a follow-up civil proceeding, Ebrahim
was awarded compensation for the kidnapping.74
The approach adopted by the South African Supreme Court in Ebrahim was
welcomed by South African scholars as a departure from the "bad old days.""
Courts extended the doctrine beyond the facts of Ebrahim in subsequent cases.
In State v Wellem 76 and State v Mabena,77 the new rule of Ebrahim was applied to cases in which, by mutual agreement of law enforcement personnel, the
regular extradition procedures were circumvented. Ebrahim can be considered a
settled precedent: South African courts do not uphold jurisdiction over persons
kidnapped from abroad by the state anymore. However, this rule is based
predominantly on municipal law, rather than a consideration of international
law. Although the court did briefly consider the importance of respect for the
sovereignty of another state in its evaluation of the rule, it was more like a
factual consideration in evaluating the municipal law rule and cannot be equated

69. Ebrahim, 31 Intl Legal Mat at 891.
70. Ex parte Ebrahim: In re State v Maseko, 1988 (1) SALR 991 (Transvaal).
71. Ebrabim, 31 Intl Legal Mat at 899.
72. Id at 896.
73. Id.
74. Ebrahim v Minister of Law and Order, 1993 (2) SALR 559 (C). See also
Pretorius, 18 S African Yrbk Intl L at 146 (cited in note 68).
75. John Dugard, No Jurisdiction Over Abducted Persons in Roman-Dutch Law: Male
Captus, Male Detentus, 7 S African J Hum Rts 199, 200 (1991). See also M.G. Cowling,
Unmasking "Disguised" Extradition-Some Glimmer of Hope, 109 S African L J 241
(1992); Hercules Booysen, Jurisdiction to Try Abducted Persons and the Application of International Law in South African Law, 16 S African Yrbk Intl L 133 (1990-91); Pretorius,
18 S Afr Yrbk Intl L 142 (cited in note 68); Neville Botha, 19 S African Yrbk Intl L 219
(cited in note 13).
76. 1993 (2) SACR 18 (A).
77. 1993 (2) SACR 295 (A).
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with the proper application of international law as such. 7' Nevertheless,
Ebrabim represents an important precedent insofar as the court evaluates the
international implications of its ruling. Ebrabim provides at least an indication
of a customary rule of international law which prohibits jurisdiction over a
person abducted from abroad in violation of international law.
3. Zimbabwe
Largely influenced by its counterpart in South Africa, in 1992 the Supreme
Court of Zimbabwe overruled old precedents which had followed the male
captus, bene detentus rule. In State v Beahan,79 Chief Justice Gubbay thoroughly considered Anglo-American precedents including United States v AlvarezMachain and balanced them against State v Ebrahim. He concluded:
In my opinion it is essential that, in order to promote confidence in and
respect for the administration of justice and preserve the judicial process
from contamination, a court should decline to compel an accused person to
undergo trial in circumstances where his appearance before it has been
facilitated by an act of abduction undertaken by the prosecuting State.
There is an inherent objection to such a course both on grounds of public
policy pertaining to international ethical norms and because it imperils and
corrodes the peaceful coexistence and mutual respect of sovereign nations.
For abduction is illegal under international law, provided the abductor was
not acting on his own initiative and without the authority or connivance of
his government. A contrary view would amount to a declaration that the
end justifies the means, thereby encouraging States to become law-breakers
in order to secure the conviction of a private individual."0
Because the case dealt with a consensual circumvention of the extradition
procedure rather than a kidnapping, this language amounts to dicta. However,
it nonetheless expresses the court's strong condemnation of the exercise of
jurisdiction on facts like those in Alvarez-Macbain. The opinion also contains an
inherent objection to such a course both on grounds of public policy pertaining
to international ethical norms and because it imperils and corrodes the peaceful
co-existence and mutual respect of sovereign nations. The court recognizes that
abduction is an improper basis for exercising jurisdiction under international
law, provided the abductor was not acting on his own initiative and without the
authority or connivance of his government. A contrary view would amount to a
declaration that the end justifies the means, thereby encouraging states to become
law-breakers in order to secure the conviction of a private individual. Even with
the consent of the state from which the defendant was taken, in Beaban, the
Supreme Court allowed the trial court discretion over whether to exercise
jurisdiction. Thus, Beahan stands for a strong condemnation of the exercise of

78. Compare Booysen, 16 S African Yrbk Intl L at 137 (cited in note 75).
79. 1992 (1) SACR 307 (A).
80. Id at 317.
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jurisdiction over a person abducted from abroad in violation of international
law. This view is at least partly based on a consideration of international law.
4. Australia
In Levinge v Director of Custodial Services,81 the defendant challenged the
court's jurisdiction on the grounds that he was improperly extradited to Australia. The defendant alleged that he was extradited only after being wrongfully
arrested in Mexico and forcibly delivered by Mexican police across the border
into the United States at the instigation of the FBI and at the request or with the
connivance of the Australian Federal Police. Once in the United States, the
defendant was lawfully extradited to Australia.82
In making its decision about jurisdiction, the court considered the
Eichmann83 case from Israel and all relevant Anglo-American precedents starting with Ker v Illinois.84 It was not persuaded by the male captus, bene detentus
line of cases, however, and instead followed the approach of the English court in
Ex parte Driver.8" The Court concluded:
Where a person, however unlawfully, is brought into the jurisdiction and
is before a court in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal
with him or her. But it also has discretion not to do so, where to exercise
[S]uch
its discretion would involve an abuse of the court's process ....
conduct may exist, including wrongful and even unlawful involvement in
bypassing the regular machinery for extradition and participation in
unauthorized and unlawful removal of criminal suspects from one jurisdiction to another.86
No evidence could be established in Levinge that the Australian police were
involved in the expulsion of the plaintiff from Mexico. No violation of international law was argued in the case. The court implies, nonetheless, that a forcible
unilateral abduction would be a strong case for staying criminal proceedings in
order to prevent abuse of process. Therefore, an Australian court most probably
would not exercise jurisdiction over a person abducted from abroad in violation
of international law. This result might not even require a reference to international law as it can be achieved by application of national law.
5. New Zealand
A similar discretionary approach to jurisdiction was followed by a New
Zealand court in Hartley.87 The appellate court allowed the trial court to
exercise its discretion in deciding whether to discharge a fugitive seized in Aus-

81. 9 NSWR 546 (Ct App 1987).
82. Id at 549.

83. See subsection II.B.7.
84. Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436 (1886); see also text accompanying note 18.
85. Driver, 2 All ER 698.
86. Levinge, 9 NSWR at 556G-557A.
87. Regina v Hartley, [1978] 2 NZLR 199 (Ct App Wellington).
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tralia under an informal agreement between the Melbourne and Wellington
police. The court found that the trial court had discretion over the discharge
even though there may have been no violation of international law."8 The court
commented:
Some may say that in the present case a New Zealand citizen attempted to
avoid a criminal responsibility by leaving the country: that his subsequent
conviction has demonstrated the utility of the short cut adopted by the
police to have him brought back. But this must never become an area
where it will be sufficient to consider that the end has justified the means.
The issues raised by this affair are basic to the whole concept of freedom
in society.8 9
Although Hartley was a case of informal extradition, rather than forcible
abduction, the court's language in Hartley condemning ends that do not justify
the means applies even more strongly to a case involving forcible abduction.
New Zealand courts have not specifically addressed the question of jurisdiction
over an abducted defendant, but Hartley stands as a strong precedent for
denying jurisdiction.
This decision was the basis for the English decision in Ex parte Mackeson, 0
which was the first serious challenge to the male captus, bene detentus rule under
English law. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that New Zealand courts
traditionally rely heavily on English precedents such as those found in Mackeson
and Bennett,9 it is fair to conclude that New Zealand courts would not uphold
jurisdiction in a case of forcible abduction. Hartley provided no opportunity for
the court to consider international law. Based on Hartley, one can assume,
however, that New Zealand is in favor of a rule of international law prohibiting
the exercise of jurisdiction over abducted persons where international law does
not provide for an exception.
6. Germany
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany faced the question of jurisdiction over abducted persons in two 1986 decisions." The Court examined
relevant international practice-mostly Anglo-American precedents, Swiss and
French cases, and the Eicbmann case from Israel 93-and concluded that there
was no rule of customary international law prohibiting jurisdiction over abducted persons in general. It ruled that the authorities of the abducting state have to
return an alleged offender only if the state of origin claims the right to have the
individual back. 94 Consequently, in a subsequent case, the Federal Supreme

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id at 217.
Id at 216-217.
Mackeson, 75 Crim App 25.
Bennett, 3 All ER 138.
39 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1427 and 3021 (1986).
See subsection II.B.7.
39 NJW 1428 (1987).
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Court found that further proceedings were barred when the Netherlands demanded the return of an individual who was lured from the Netherlands to
Germany by German officials.9"
Legal scholars have heavily criticized the Federal Constitutional Court for its
narrow holding that the state of origin must make a claim, complaining that the
Court lacked respect for international law.96 These critic may have been overly
harsh, however, given that the Court based its holding on a sufficiently broad
analysis of state practice and scholarly writing. The cases analyzed did not clearly
indicate that a contrary rule existed in 1986. Therefore, the judgment of the
Federal Constitutional Court cannot be considered to misstate customary international law as of that time. The more interesting question, however, is
whether the Court, if confronted with a new case, would re-evaluate its 1986
decisions in light of a change in state practice. The developments in England and
South Africa, and particularly the fierce reaction of states after Alvarez-Machain,
should cause the Federal Constitutional Court to question seriously whether the
holdings in its 1986 decisions are still valid.
The Federal Constitutional Court generally has been very careful in determining rules of customary international law.97 Whenever a question of customary international law is at issue, the Court carefully examines relevant state
practice and scholarly writing.98 Given the doubts about the continued validity

95. 40 NJW 3087 (1987).

96. See F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of
International Law, in F.A. Mann, ed, Further Studies in International Law 339, 344
(Oxford 1989) ("There is ... no justification for the suggestion which has sometimes
been intimated, particularly in Germany and the United States of America, that it is relevant to the question of the court's jurisdiction whether a demand for the return has been
made [citations omitted]."); Bernd Schiinemann, Materielle Tatverdachtspriifung und
v6lkerrechtswidrige Entfihrung als nationalstaatliche Sprengsttze im internationalen
Auslieferungsverkehr, in Jdrgen Wolter, ed, 140 Jahre Goltdammer's Arcbiv [fir Strafrecbt
215 (R.V. Deckers Verlag 1993).
97. See, for example, 16 BVerfGE 27, 33-61 (1964) (customary international law does
not prohibit exercise of jurisdiction over foreign state for claims arising out of commercial
activity); 66 BVerfGE 39, 65-66 (1984) (storage of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes
is not prohibited by customary international law); 75 BVerfGE 1, 18-33 (1988) (principle
of non bis in idem is not yet a rule of customary international law). In a 1994 decision,
a three-judges panel of the Federal Constitutional Court, however, simply mentioned in an
obiter dictum that different opinions exist with respect to a legal bar to jurisdiction over
an abductee having its basis in international law; 48 NJW 651 (1995). In a case where
the outcome of this question is decisive, the full court would have to take a closer look.
98. In some cases, the Court has sought outside opinions on the state of customary
international law. Recently, persons prosecuted by reunified Germany for espionage for the
former German Democratic Republic challenged their convictions under the theory that
customary international law exempts spies from punishment after unification of former
enemy states. The court requested a legal opinion from the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg and ultimately dismissed this
defense based on the opinion's conclusion. 92 BVerf GE 277 (1995). See also the legal
opinion of the Max Planck Institute which has since been published. Jochen Abr. Frowein,
et al, Vblkerrechtlicbe Fragen der Stra/barkeit von Spionen aus der ehemaligen DDR 1
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of its 1986 decision, and the Court's general approach to cases based on customary international law, the German Federal Constitutional Court is likely to
re-examine the issue when confronted with another case of forcible abduction.
7. Israel
In the Eichmann case, Israel exercised jurisdiction against the Nazi war
criminal, Adolf Eichmann, who was kidnapped from Argentina by Mossad
agents.99 The case is often cited as a precedent for the rule that a defendant
cannot dispute the jurisdiction of a court simply because of his forcible abduction. However, the issue of jurisdiction had already been settled by diplomatic
means when the criminal proceedings started in the Eichmann case. After Israel
tendered an official apology for violating sovereign authority, Argentina waived
further action on the abduction."' Therefore, the case cannot appropriately be
cited as precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction over an abducted defendant
where the state from which the defendant was abducted objects. Furthermore,
the case is not a good example of customary law on jurisdiction because of the
extraordinary crimes of Adolf Eichmann. Even strong critics of jurisdiction over
who have commitabducted persons will allow for an exception for defendants
101
ted heinous crimes like the ones of Adolf Eichmann.
It is probably more accurate to look to less extreme cases when determining
customary Israeli practice regarding jurisdiction over abducted persons. In 1972,
Israel military forces captured a Turkish citizen, Faik Balut, during a raid into
Lebanese territory. He was convicted by the Military Court of Lod on August 7,
1973. The court rejected the defense of forcible abduction citing Ker v Illinois

(Springer-Verlag 1995).
99. 36 ILR 18 (Dist Ct Jerusalem 1961); 36 ILR 277 (Sup Ct 1962).
100. See Louis Henkin, et al, InternationalLaw 1085 (West 3d ed 1993).
101. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 Am J Intl L 444, 490 (1990) (asserting that there are
"[c]ases that are bigger than law-Adolf Eichmann, for example"); Mann, Reflections at
478-79 (cited in note 96); Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: InternationalLaw And
How We Use It 472 (Oxford 1994); Jianmeng Shen, Note, Responsibilities and Jurisdiction
Subsequent to ExtraterritorialApprehension, 23 Denv J Intl L & Policy 43, 52 (1994). See

also ABA Report No 110 (Feb 1993) ("Abducting someone charged with international
crimes against humanity might be asserted as an exception (the seizure of Eichmann from
Argentina might have been such a case, if Israel had claimed responsibility)."), quoted in
Limits II at 112 (cited in note 44). The U.N. Security Council, however, affirmed in the
Eichmann case that nonconsensual kidnapping by agents of another state violates international law, even when the victim of the kidnapping committed offenses subject to universal
jurisdiction. Consequently, the Security Council ordered Israel to make reparations to
Argentina, SC Res 138, UN SCOR, 15th Sess, 868th mtg at 4, UN Doc S/4349 (1960)
(noting that resolution in no way condoned "odious crimes" of which Eichmann was

accused).
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and Eichmann.112 Another case involving the abduction of Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu in September 1986 caused widespread anger among
European countries. The nuclear technician had revealed details of the Israeli
nuclear weapon arsenal to the British Sunday Times. Before the report was
published, however, he was kidnapped from Italy by Israeli secret service agents.
He was convicted of treason and espionage in a closed criminal proceeding; only
the guilty verdict and sentence were made public. °3 Vanunu's appeal was
dismissed by the Israeli Supreme Court on May 27, 1990.' 4 The European
Parliament protested vehemently against the judgment in a June 14, 1990 resolution. 10s
Israel has used kidnapping, however, for purposes other than simply to
subject alleged offenders to the jurisdiction of its courts. In July 1989, for
example, military commandos kidnapped Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid from
Lebanon.0 6 In May 1994, the Shiite leader Mustafa Dirani fell victim to a
similar operation.0 7 The abductees served as pawns to obtain the release of
Israeli soldiers. Other political opponents, such as the Hizbollah General Secretary Sheik Mussawi, were abducted and killed without any attempt to subject
them to court proceedings.0 8 The unique circumstances of Israel's national
security, however, raise doubts about whether any of these Israeli cases should
be factored into a determination of customary international law. At the very
least, Israel has been at the extremes in these cases. It is thus hard to say that its
practice with regard to jurisdiction over abducted persons represents an international consensus.

102. Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A
New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 Mich L Rev 1087, 1104, 1108-1119
(1974); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1 International Extradition: United States Law and Practice
205 (Oceana 2d ed 1987).

103. Vanunu was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. As of May 1996, Vanunu was
still in prison despite appeals from the international community. John Kifner, Israel Finds
Nuclear Technician Guilty of Treason and Espionage, NY Times Al (Mar 25, 1988);
Israeli given 18 Years in Atomic Secrets Case, NY Times All (Mar 25, 1988); William
J. Broad, Scientist at Work: Joseph Rotblat Still Battling Nuclear Weapons 50 Years After
Manhattan Project, NY Times Cl (May 21, 1996) (quoting Dr. Rotblat) ("He has suffered

enough.").
104. 1990 OJ (C 175) 168.
105. Id.
106. Joel Brinkley, Israeli Commandos Abduct a Chief of Pro-Iranian Group in Lebanon, NY Times Al (July 29, 1989).
107. Clyde Haberman, Israelis Abduct Guerilla Chief from Lebanon, NY Times Al
(May 22, 1994).
108. Clyde Haberman, Israelis Kill Chief of Pro-Iran Shiites in South Lebanon, NY
Times Al (Feb 17, 1992); Chris Hedges, Killing of Sheik: Israel Waited for Months, NY
Times Al (Feb 22, 1992).
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8. France

In 1933, the French Tribunal Correctionnel d'Avesnes affirmed the rule that
there must be an inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant's apprehension
before jurisdiction can be exercised. 10° It ordered the release of a fugitive who
had been abducted from Belgium by French agents in violation of international
law.11 This holding followed a line of older cases in which the defendants were
ordered released based on the means used to apprehend them."'1 Thus, customary French state practice would seem to be clear.
However, there is some question about whether these older cases were
effectively overruled by the judgment of the Cour de Cassation in In re
Argoud.112 In that case, Antoine Argoud, an ex-colonel in the French Army,
was sentenced to death in absentia by a military court for conspiracy to assassinate President De Gaulle. Subsequently, he was abducted from Munich and
taken to Paris, where he was found and arrested by the French police acting on
information from an anonymous telephone call. Germany made no official
complaint about the abduction prior to Argoud's trial, and there was no evidence
that the French government participated in the abduction. The Court held:
[I]n international law, the State which is entitled to complain of damage
suffered by one of its nationals or protected persons exercises a right of its
own when it seeks reparation. It follows that the individual who claims to
be injured... is without any right or capacity to plead in judicial proceedings a violation of international law, a fortiori when the State in question
makes no claim.'
While it might be argued that Argoud stands for the proposition that a defendant
cannot point to the circumstances of his apprehension to defend against the
exercise of jurisdiction unless the State from which he was abducted makes an
objection, it has not been interpreted that way. French legal authorities cite
Argoud primarily as an example of a case in which jurisdiction was exercised
over a defendant who was abducted by private parties and hold that the rule
pronounced in Jolis regarding abductions by agents of the state is good law in
France." 4 This would mean that no jurisdiction may be exercised over a person
abducted from abroad.

109. In re Jolis, 7 Ann Dig 191 (1933-34).
110. Id.
111. Case Nollet, 18 Journal du Droit International Priv6 1188 (Cour d'Appel de Douai
1891) (fugitive released because French police violated Belgian territorial sovereignty to apprehend suspect); Case Jabouille, Revue de Droit International Priv6 et de Droit Pnal 1
(Cour d'Appel de Bourdeaux 1905) (fugitive released because the extradition procedure was
not followed).
112. 45 ILR 90 (Cass Crim 1964).
113. Id at 95.
114. Nguyen Quoc Dinh, et al, Droit International Public 448 (Librairie General de
droit et de jurisprudence 4th ed 1992); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit InternationalPublic 48
(Dalloz 2d ed 1992).
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9. Switzerland
Switzerland also adheres to the rule of inquiry into the circumstances of
apprehension. In a 1967 case, a Swiss businessman living abroad was lured by
private persons to Switzerland where he was arrested. In determining whether to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, the Zurich Higher Court followed the
conclusion of a legal opinion of Professor Hans Schultz"Is and declined jurisdiction over the defendant." 6 The Court found that the defendant's apprehension
violated national due process and principles of extradition law under which
apprehension of a person by means of force or ruse was prohibited. Because the
prosecutor knew of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's abduction and
arrest, the court found that the knowledge alone sufficed to turn the private
operation into state action which violated extradition law. The question of a violation of international law and its consequences had been raised by the defendant, but the Court did not have to address the issue because a first obstacle to
jurisdiction was found in national due process, which the Court interpreted in
light of international law.
The Swiss Federal Court of Lausanne extended this holding in a 1982 case
by finding that it would be unlawful to extradite a person from Switzerland to
a third state when such person was tricked into entering the Switzerland by the
state requesting extradition. 17 In that case, Germany had lured a Belgian citizen from Belgium to Switzerland and subsequently requested his extradition from
Switzerland. 8 The Swiss Court held that Germany had violated the territorial
sovereignty of Belgium, and therefore, Switzerland would be an accessory after
the fact if it approved Germany's extradition request. Thus, extradition was
denied." 9 Professor Hans Schultz is of the opinion that this decision implicitly
follows the principle of ex iniuria ius non oritur (no right stems from a wrong)
and rejects the male captus, bene detentus principle. 2 ° In summary, it may be
said that Switzerland strongly rejects the exercise of jurisdiction over abductees.
10. Costa Rica
The national judicial tribunal of Costa Rica has rejected outright the exercise
of jurisdiction over persons abducted by state agents. Strikingly, the Justices of
the Supreme Court of Costa Rica unanimously censured the Alvarez-Machain
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, stating in the Court's plenary session of June
25, 1992:

115. Hans Schultz, Male Captus Bene Iudicatus?, 24 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fir
Internationales Recht 67 (1967).

116. 66 Blitter fir Ziircherische Rspr 248 (1967).
117. X, Belgian Citizen, v Swiss Justice and Police Department, 1983 Europdische
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 435 (1983).

118. Belgium does not extradite its own nationals. Thus, an extradition request to
Belgium would have been useless.
119. Belgian Citizen, 1983 Europdische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift at 438.

120. Hans Schultz, Male Captus, Bene Detentus?, 40 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fiir
Internationales Recht 105 (1984).
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Because of the profound harm to the rules of international law and to
sovereignty of States that the resolution implies, this Court resolves to
establish evidence so it be known in this way, of the inadmissibility of such
pronouncement, and has no doubt that shortly, it will be amended by the
same Court who has issued it, in support of supremacy of law and mutual
respect that must rule between the United States and all other States with
whom-under the principle of good faith-it subjected its relation, in what
concerns, to extradition treaties, which must be construed, not only according to its content, but to practice of law, teachings, and jurisprudence that
inform it."'
The resolution expressly refers to international law as a legal bar to the exercise
of jurisdiction. The statement has a self-binding effect on the Court. The Court
would be at variance with itself if it were to decide in a subsequent case that
customary international law does not constitute a legal bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction over an abductee.
11. Evaluation of State Practice
a. Interpretation of Local Laws in Accordance with International Law
The foregoing survey shows that national tribunals are increasingly holding
that when a State's authorities are a knowing or participating party to the seizure
of a person in violation of international law, or to the illegal handing over of a
person outside of applicable extradition laws, such knowledge or participation
either vitiates jurisdiction or constitutes a discretionary ground for the court to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction by reason of abuse of process."n Many of these
high court decisions are not explicitly based on international law grounds,
however, so one might doubt whether they reflect opinio juris. Nonetheless, most
of these states did consider questions of international law in the process of
interpreting their local statutes. In the Swiss case of 1967, for example, the Court
did not reach the question of whether a violation of international law had
occurred because it found that the local statute incorporated the rule of international law, and the local statute had been violated." Thus, although the decision was not reached explicitly on the basis of a violation of international law,
international law is implicit in the local law as it has been construed.
It might be argued that the distinction between cases which prohibit courts
from exercising jurisdiction and cases which give courts the discretion to exercise
jurisdiction or not indicate that there is no uniform customary rule. This distinction, however, seems to be based on the different legal techniques offered by the
national judicial systems and their respective rules of criminal procedure to apply
a rule of international law in the context of national criminal proceedings. The

121. Quoted in Limits II at 81-82 (cited in note 44).
122. Shearer, Starke's InternationalLaw at 92 n 11 (cited in note 36).
123. 66 BIftter fir Ziircherische Rspr 250-253 (1967).
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very existence of different legal systems makes it unlikely that municipal courts
reach a common result by exactly the same method. For the purpose of establishing a customary rule of international law, it is more important that municipal
courts reach the same result than that they use the same method.
The discretionary approach does not contradict a strict prohibition of
jurisdiction because even the strict prohibition knows exceptions. For instance,
an abduction and prosecution of Saddam Hussein in 1991 would arguably have
been covered by resolution 678 of the Security Council.' 24 It is also widely
believed that the seizure of war criminals in former Yugoslavia is justified by the
mandate of the United Nations." z In such cases, states with a discretionary
approach, such as England and New Zealand, as well as states with a strict
prohibition to the exercise of jurisdiction over abductees, such as South Africa
and Zimbabwe, would most probably come to the same results despite the
slightly different legal rule. English and New Zealand courts most likely would
not exercise their discretion to stay such a trial, and South African and
Zimbabwean courts would allow jurisdiction because international law itself
provides the basis for an exception in these cases.
b. Concurrence of Judicial Decisions as Indication of International Law
The concurrence of judicial decisions of state courts might further indicate
the general recognition of a broad principle of law. This is well illustrated by the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of The Scotia.'26 In 1863, the
British Government adopted a series of regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. In 1864, the U.S. Congress adopted practically the same regulations, as did
the governments of nearly all the maritime countries soon thereafter.
Under these legal conditions, the Scotia (British) collided in mid-ocean with
the Berkshire (American), which was not carrying the lights required by the new
regulations. As a result, the Berkshire sank. The question was whether the
respective rights and duties of the two vessels were determined by the general
maritime law before the regulations of 1863. It was held that these rights and

124. UN SCOR, 45th Sess, 2963rd mtg at 27, UN Doc S/INF/46 (1990) ("The Security
Council,

. .

. acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

. .

.authorizes Member States ...

to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.").
125. Steven Erlanger, NATO Action Reflects Shift in Tactics, NY Times A5 (July 11,
1997) ("'Our mandate is to arrest people who have been accused of war crimes and turn
them over for trial,' Mr. Clinton said."); Richard Holbrooke, Bold Stroke in Bosnia, NY
Times A27 (July 11, 1997) ("[T]he Dayton agreements, which were signed by the leaders
of all the parties to the war in Bosnia, including the Bosnian Serbs themselves, contain
sufficient authority to detain and arrest indicted war criminals."); Coalition for International Justice, Mr. President: Order the Arrest of War Criminals in Bosnia Now!, NY Times
A8 (July 15, 1997). But see Rufliand verurteilt Sfor-Einsatz (Russia condemns SFOR
operation), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1 (July 12, 1997); Barbara Crossette, U.N.
Chief Seems Unlikely to Make Abrupt Changes, NY Times A8 (Dec 19, 1996).
126. 81 US 170 (1871).
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duties must be determined by the new customary rules of international law that
had evolved through the widespread adoption of the British regulations, and
therefore, fault lay with the Berkshire. The court stated:
This is not giving to the Statutes of any nation extra-territorial effect. It is
not treating them as general maritime laws, but it is recognition of the
historical fact that, by common consent of mankind, these rules have been
acquiesced in as of general obligation. 27
With respect to the question of whether jurisdiction over an abductee from
abroad may be exercised, the same rationale applies. Taking into consideration
the fact that most of the court decisions analyzed in the previous section realized
the implications of international law for questions of national law, it is fair to
conclude that the concurrence of national judicial decisions indicates a common
consent with respect to a customary rule of international law.
In some instances the lack of additional judgments by other national courts
also indicate support for the modern rule of inquiry into the circumstances of a
defendant's apprehension. In a legal system where law enforcement personnel are
convinced that a transborder kidnapping would cause the national courts to
decline jurisdiction, there is no incentive to kidnap persons and consequently no
precedent is developed. Professor Esp6sito, for example, explains in his commentary on Alvarez-Machain that certain articles of the Spanish Constitution have
been interpreted by Spanish courts in such a way that makes it highly unlikely
that a court can exercise jurisdiction over an abductee.2 8 Therefore, it is clear
that, in addition to the states whose courts have explicitly declined jurisdiction
over abducted persons, other states also follow the new rule of customary
international law. 9

127. Id at 188.

128. Carlos D. Esp6sito, Male captus, bene detentus: A prop6sito de la sentencia del
tribuno de Estados Unidos en el caso Alvarez Machain, 2 Estudios de Jurisprudencia 7
(Mar-Apr 1993).
129. See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 67 (Grotius 2d ed 1986) ("Failures to
act are in themselves just as much evidence of a state's attitude as are actions. They
similarly reflect the way in which a nation approaches its environment."). See also

Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (second phase), 1955 Intl Ct Justice 4, 22
(1955) ("The practice of certain States which refrain from exercising protection in favour
of a naturalized person when the latter has in fact, by his prolonged absence, severed his
links with what is no longer for him anything but his nominal country, manifests the view
of these States that, in order to be capable of being invoked against another State, nationality must correspond with the factual situation."). Compare Case of the S.S. Lotus
(France v Turkey) in which France referred to the absence of criminal prosecutions by
states in similar situations and from this deduced tacit consent in the practice which
therefore became a legal custom. The Permanent Court of Justice rejected this and declared
that even if such a practice of abstention from instituting criminal proceedings could be
proved in fact, it would not amount to custom. It held that "only if such a duty to
abstain were based on their [the states'] being conscious of a duty to abstain would it be
possible to speak of an international custom." 1927 PCIJ (Ser A) No 10 at 28 (Sept
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c. Indication of the Weakening of the Alvarez-Machain Rule
The old maxim of male captus, bene detentus seems still to be alive in Israel.
It was further followed by the United States in Alvarez-Machain. But even in the
United States there is evidence that the opinio juris might have changed. A
federal court, presided over by Judge Rafeedie and a unanimous panel of the 9th
Circuit, had already declined jurisdiction over Alvarez-Machain when a six-tothree majority of the Supreme Court turned back the wheel. Even though these
decisions have no authoritative weight after the Supreme Court's decision, they
might indicate that the federal judiciary has doubts when confronted about the
legality of exercising jurisdiction over abductees. Other courts in the United
States had previously given warnings to law enforcement personnel that they
should no longer rely on the old rule."'
It is interesting to note that the U.S. Supreme Court did not exclude the idea
of the dismissal of an abductee's indictment under the Court's supervisory
power. In McNabb v United States, the Court held that a federal court must not
allow itself to be made an "accomplice in willful disobedience of law." 3 '
Guided by considerations of justice, federal courts may exercise their supervisory
power to remedy a violation of recognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity,
and finally, to deter illegal conduct."3 2 Several courts have already threatened
to exercise the supervisory power to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case.' 33 It
is therefore possible for American courts to deny jurisdiction over abductees
without disregarding United States v Alvarez-Machain. The a u thorit y of
Alvarez-Machain as a precedent for international law is weakened by the fierce
dissent of Justice Stevens, who called the majority's opinion a "monstrous
decision."' 34 The dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices O'Connor
and Blackmun, has been more persuasive for courts in other countries than the
majority's holding. For instance, the House of Lords explicitly relied on the
13
dissent when making its decision in Bennett.'

1927).
130. See, for example, the explicit warning in Day v State, 763 SW2d 535, 536 (Tex
App 1988). After the decision, several courts openly criticized the Supreme Court's
holding. United States v Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F3d 754, 774 (9th Cir 1995) (Noonan
concurring) (strongly condemning government officials' participation in international
kidnapping); United States v Matos, 1996 WL 104264 *4 (D Puerto Rico 1996) (declining
to extend); Sneed v Tennessee, 872 SW2d 930, 935 (Tenn Crim App 1993).
131. McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 345 (1943).
132. United States v Hasting, 461 US 499, 505 (1983).
133. United States v Toscanino, 500 F2d 267, 276 (2d Cir 1974), reh'g en banc denied,
504 F2d 859 (1975); United States v Lira, 515 F2d 68, 73 (2d Cir 1975) (Oakes
concurring), cert denied 423 US 847 (1975).
134. 504 US at 687 (Stevens dissenting).
135. Regina v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court (Ex parte Bennett), 3 All ER at 148,
154. See also the preference which was given to Justice Stevens's opinion in State v
Wellem, 2 S African Crim Rep 18, 28 (E Cape Div 1993).
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Furthermore, the majority's approach was almost unanimously condemned
3 6
by scholars and commentators nationwide."
On the one hand, this almost

136. An international resolution, for example, was adopted by the XVth International
Congress of Penal Law in 1994 prohibiting jurisdiction by an abducting state. The
Congress found international abduction to be "contrary to public international law" and
urged that it be "a bar to prosecution." The resolution specifically demands that the
victim of an abduction be brought into the position which existed prior to the abduction.
Resolutions of the XVth International Congress of Penal Law, Section IV, The
Regionalization of International Criminal Law and the Protection of Human Rights in
International Cooperative Procedures in Criminal Matters, 66 Int'l Rev Penal L 67, 70
19 (1995).
The authors are aware that the strength of an argument cannot solely be measured
by the number of supporters. The compilation of critics and defenders of the decision
shows, however, that the Supreme Court did not even succeed in convincing the national
legal community with its decision, let alone the international legal community.
The following authors have criticized the Court's ruling: William J. Aceves, 3 Sw J
L & Trade Am 101 (1996); David D. Almroth, Note, 23 Seton Hall L Rev 1128 (1993);
Manuel R. Angulo and James D. Rearson, 16 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 245 (1993);
Charles Biblowit, 9 NY Intl L Rev 105 (1996); Jonathan A. Bush, 45 Stan L Rev 939
(1993); Hector H. Cirdenas, Jr., 16 Houston J Intl L 101 (1993); Tom Cartmell, Note,
41 U Kan L Rev 635 (1993); Elizabeth Chien, Note, 15 U Hawaii L Rev 179 (1993);
Phillip J. Cooper, 15 Chicano-Latino L Rev 38 (1994); Lori Pate Daves, Note, 38 Loyola
L Rev 1173 (1993); Valerie Epps, International Practitioner's Notebook No 55, 6 (Oct
1992); Scott S. Evans, 137 Milit L Rev 187 (1992); C. Douglas Ferguson, 21 NC J Intl
L & Comm Reg 561 (1996); R.T. Francis, Comment, 20 N Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement 117 (1993); Michael J. Glennon, 86 Am J Intl L 746 (1992); Heidi L. Goebel,
Note, 25 U Toledo L Rev 297 (1994); Michelle D. Gouin, Note, 26 Conn L Rev 759
(1994); Loubna W. Haddad, Note, 5 St Thomas L Rev 543 (1993); Patrick M. Haggan,
17 Suffolk Transnad L Rev 438 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases,
106 Harv L Rev 163 (1992); Philip B. Heymann and Ian Heath Gershengorn, 4 Crim L
F 155 (1993); John R. Hitt, Note, 1993 Detroit Coll L Rev 193 (1993); Brigitte Belton
Homrig, Comment, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 671 (1993); Yvonne W. Jicka, Note, 14 Miss
Coll L Rev 103 (1993); Jonathan E. Katz, Note, 23 Cal W Intl L J 395 (1993); Leigh
Ann Kennedy, Note, 27 Creighton L Rev 1105 (1993-94); Michael Kristofco, Note, 20
Ohio N U L Rev 191 (1993); Alfred Paul LeBlanc, Jr., Note, 53 La L Rev 1411 (1993);
Aimee Lee, Comment, 17 Fordham Intl L J 126 (1993); Jami Leeson, Note, 25 Ga J Ind
& Comp L 641 (1996); Jonathan A. Lonner, 83 J Crim L & Criminol 998 (1993);
Edmund S. McAlister, Note, 43 DePaul L Rev 449 (1994); Thomas Michael McDonnell,
37 Wm & Mary L Rev 1401 (1996); Patrick M. McFadden, 81 Cornell L Rev 4 (1995);
Michael G. McKinnon, Note, 20 Pepperdine L Rev 1503 (1993); Carrie S. McLain, Note,
24 U W La L Rev 321 (1993); Carol R. Miller, Human Rights 24 (Spring 1994); Paul
Mitchell, 29 Cornell Intl L J 383 (1996); Joseph Miller, Note, 6 Pace Intl L Rev 221
(1994); Jordan J. Paust, 67 St John's L Rev 551 (1993); Ian J. Platt, Case Comment, 27
Suffolk U L Rev 271 (1993); Stephanie A. Re, 44 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 265
(1993); Amy K. Rehm, Note, 18 U Dayton L Rev 889 (1993); David Ring, Note, 15
Whittier L Rev 495 (1994); Hernan De J. Ruiz-Bravo, 20 Hastings Const L Q 833
(1993); Steven M. Schneebaum, 18 Brooklyn J Intl L 303 (1992); Aaron Schwabach and
S.A. Patchett, 25 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 19 (1993); Analisa W. Scrirnger, Note, 7
Temple Intl & Comp L J 369 (1993); Jacques Semmelman, 30 Colum J Transnad L 513
(1992); Michael Slattery, Note, 16 NY L Sch J Intl & Comp L 159 (1996); Jack W.
Snyder, Note, 31 Duquesne L Rev 939 (1993); Candace R. Somers, Note, 18 NC J Intl
L & Comm Reg 213 (1992); Royal J. Stark, Comment, 9 Conn J Intl L 113 (1993);
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unanimous criticism of scholars might cause the Supreme Court to reconsider its
ruling in the future. On the other hand, this criticism on the national level makes
it even more unlikely that Alvarez-Machain serves as a persuasive model on the
international level.
United States v Alvarez-Machain is not a precedent which enjoys high respect
in the legal community. The strong reactions in the aftermath of the decision
even prompted Congress to conduct a hearing on the subject and to introduce
legislation to address the issue.137 Shortly after the decision, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a memorandum which stated, "the Alvarez-Machain
decision does not constitute a 'green light' for unrestricted efforts to secure
custody over persons abroad without regard to international extradition treaties,
'
or the laws of foreign states, [or] international law."138
The spirit of the Alvarez-Machain decision has not disappeared, however. A
presidential directive,' 39 signed by President Clinton in 1995, stated, "[i]f we do
not receive cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition
140
we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation."
This new policy seems to be much more restrictive than the policies under earlier
administrations.141 It appears that under certain circumstances, the new presi-

Ralph G. Steinhardt, 4 Crim L F 135 (1993); Andrew L. Strauss, 67 Temple L Rev 1209
(1994); Bradley Thrush, 11 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 181 (1994); Michael Albert Tomasulo,
Note, 67 S Cal L Rev 475 (1994); Terry L. Traveland, Note, 45 Baylor L Rev 185
(1993); Ruth Wedgwood, 6 Am U J Intl L & Pol 537 (1991); Kristin Berdan Weissman,
Comment, 27 UC Davis L Rev 459 (1994); Stephen M. Welsh, Note, 44 Mercer L Rev
1023 (1993); Andrew L. Wilder, 32 Va J Intl L 979 (1992); Michael R. Wing, Note, 23
Ga J Intl & Comp L 435 (1993); Jeanne M. Woods, 14 BU Intl L J 1 (1996); John J.
Yered, Comment, 17 Suffolk Transnatl L J 218 (1994).
The following authors have defended the Court's ruling: Tarek N. Fahmi, Note, 20
W State U L Rev 695 (1993); Matthew L. Guzman, 17 SIU L J 317 (1993); Malvina
Halberstam, 86 Am J Intl L 736 (1992); Charles L. Hobson, Natl L J 15 (July 6, 1992);
Mitchell J. Matorin, 41 Duke L J 907 (1992); Antonin Scalia, 40 SLU L J 1119 (1996);
Michael J. Weiner, 12 Wis Intl L J 125 (1993).
137. On July 7, 1992, the House of Representatives considered the International Kidnapping and Extradition Act, 138 Cong Rec H6019-01, 102d Cong, 2d Sess (1992). This
legislation would have barred prosecution of a person who is forcibly abducted from
abroad by an agent of the United States when an extradition treaty is in place. In the
Senate, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, S 72, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (1993). The amendment would have prohibited
direct arrest and abduction of persons by U.S. agents abroad. Both pieces of legislation
failed.
138. U.S. Department of Justice Memo on United States v Alvarez-Machain, 32 Intl
Legal Mat 277 (1993).
139. In February 1997, the Associated Press wrote, "The United States is willing to
snatch suspected terrorists by force from foreign countries that refuse to cooperate in their
extradition, according to a newly declassified presidential directive." John Diamond,
Associated Press, U.S. Will Take Terrorists By Force, 1997 WL 4854819 at *1 (Feb 4,
1997).
140. Id.
141. Compare George Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 783
Current Policy 3 (1986); FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing before the
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dential directive might call for state-sponsored kidnapping that would otherwise
be a clear violation of international law. However, it is more likely that in cases
where the new presidential directive comes into play kidnapping might be
justified under international law.
The Supreme Court may also be shifting to a more worldly view of national
issues. In the past, according to constitutional law scholar Mark Tushnet, "[t]he
Supreme Court has almost never treated constitutional experience elsewhere as
relevant.""' However; Justice Stephen Breyer recently discussed the federal systems of other countries in a dissent over a recent case about local authority over
gun control. He wrote, "Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution,
not those of other nations.""' Nonetheless, his opinion suggested the possibility of a global approach to U.S. jurisprudence in the future: "experience [of other
countries] may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem." 1" Using a more global approach in
Alvarez-Machain might have resulted in more weight given to customary international law and a different outcome altogether.
Since the Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, transborder abduction issues
involving the United States have arisen and continue to arise. There is some
evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to revisit important constitutional decisions, which are based on plainly inadequate rationales, but which have
become controlling precedent for the sole reason that they once attracted a
narrow majority.1 45 This raises hopes that the Court will have a second look at
Alvarez-Machain in the near future.
C. ACTS OR DECLARATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES
1. Reactions of Foreign States Following Alvarez-Machain
Forcible abductions are still sufficiently rare that foreign states do not
generally have the opportunity to declare their legal standpoint on such an issue.
Alvarez-Machain, however, provoked many reactions by foreign governments
which can be considered "pronouncements by states that undertake to state a
rule of international law." 4' Many governments expressed outrage that the
United States believes it has the right to decide unilaterally to abduct one of their

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 101 Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 8, 1989) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State at 24) (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant
Attorney, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice at 9).
142. Linda Greenhouse, Appealing to the Laiv's Brooding Spirit, NY Times D4 (July 6,

1997).
143. Printz v United States, 117 SCt 2365, 2405 (1997) (Breyer dissenting).
144. Id at 2405.
145. See Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia concurring). This is a
more general trend in how the U.S. Supreme Court is handling its caseload. For a recent
controversial discussion about the value of stare decisis, see Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992).
146. See Restatement of Foreign Relations S 103(2)(d).
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nationals. Some countries told the U.S. State Department that they believe that
such actions would violate the bilateral extradition treaties.147 The reaction was
strongest throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of the reactions of
foreign states to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision include the following:
o On June 15, 1992, the Colombian government stated that it "energetically
rejects the judgment issued by the United States Supreme Court." Although
recognizing that the decision dealt only with a treaty between the United States
and Mexico, the Government felt that "its substance threatens the legal stability
of [all] public treaties." 48
o On June 16, 1992, Argentina's Justice Minister called the decision "an
historic regression in criminal law" while its President on June 18 declared it to
be a "horror." 49
o Chile's Foreign Minister made a statement on June 16, 1992, in which he
declared that the Chilean government "simply does not accept [the U.S. Supreme
Court decision]."'
o In Peru, on June 16, 1992, Lima's Superior Justice Court President, Lino
Roncallo, called the move an "attack on the sovereignty of foreign countries."...
o On June 16, 1992, the head of Venezuela's Foreign Relations Legislative
Commission said that the Commission had requested that President Carlos
Andres Perez revise its extradition treaty with the United States as a result of the
decision. The president of the Venezuelan Judges Association called the Alvarez1 2
Machain decision "a violation of human rights."'
- Costa Rica's Justice Minister, Elizabeth Odio, declared that the decision
5 3
was "inconceivable."
o On June 17, 1992, the Bolivian Justice Minister stated, "the U.S., with the
title of owner of the world, is declaring that there are no borders, sovereign
states or legal organizations in the world."' ' The country's Vice President
called the decision a clear violation of international law and an "illogical and
unilateral measure." 5 5
o On June 18, 1992, Brazil's Foreign Minister condemned the decision as
contrary to the OAS Charter.' 6 Justice Minister Celio Borja said that the

147. Kidnapping Suspects Abroad at 110-11 (prepared statement of Alan J. Kreczko,
Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State) (cited in note 42).
148. Id at 112.
149. Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision Endorsing Right to Kidnap Foreigners for
Prosecution in U.S., Notisur-South American & Caribbean Political Affairs, 1992 WL
2410586 at *1 (June 30, 1992).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Associated Press, Kidnap Ruling Met By Outrage Abroad, New Orleans Times-Picayune A14 (June 17, 1992).
154. Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision at *2 (cited in note 149).
155. Ruiz-Bravo, 20 Hastings Const L Q at 836 (cited in note 10).
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decision violated the "fundamental principle of international society and of limiting the jurisdiction of nation-states to respective territories. "157
* On June 30, 1992, the lower house of the parliament of Uruguay adopted
a resolution which asserted that the decision shows "a lack of understanding of
the most elemental norms of international law, 1and
in particular an absolute
58
perversion of the function of extradition treaties."

a Jamaica's Minister of Security and Justice criticized the decision as based
on the principle that might makes right. He said the ruling was "an atrocity that
would disturb the world," and called on the United States to come "back to its
15 9
senses."
- The Supreme Court's decision led to a rigorous debate in the Canadian
Parliament. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs told the Canadian
Parliament that any attempt by the United States to kidnap someone in Canada
would be regarded as a criminal act and a violation of the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty. 6
" Spain's President publicly criticized the decision as "erroneous."16
" The Minister of Justice of Switzerland, Jiirg Kistler, expressed his disapproval of the Alvarez-Machain decision with the following statement: "Imagine
where it would lead if every country would do that. You would have anarchy.""' The statement is all the more astonishing because Switzerland gives
high value to its neutrality, and therefore, does not comment lightly on court
decisions of foreign countries.
* It almost goes without saying that the negative reaction to the AlvarezMachain decision was strongest in Mexico.' Mexico had filed a formal protest with the U.S. government and expressly sought the return of Dr. AlvarezMachain.1' In a press conference after the pronouncement of the decision, the
Mexican Foreign Minister repudiated the decision as invalid and illegal. 6 Both
the Mexican Chamber of Representatives and the Mexican Senate rejected the

Alvarez-Machain ruling in statements made on June 16, 1992.66 Mexico and

Canada had both submitted amicus curiae briefs in support of Alvarez-Machain
to the U.S. courts strongly objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction. 67
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o The Permanent Council of the OAS expressed concern about the decision
and requested a legal opinion on the issue from the Inter-American Juridical
Committee.' 68
o The Second Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and of Government,
gathered in Madrid on July 23 and 24, 1992, agreed to ask the General Assembly of the United Nations to solicit an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice. 69 Introducing the item on behalf of the twenty-one member
states of the Ibero-American Conference, Spain suggested that the following
questions should be addressed:
1. Does the conduct of a State which, directly or indirectly, arrests or
apprehends a person in the territory of another State without the latter's
consent, and transfers him to its own territory to subject him to its criminal
jurisdiction, constitute a breach of international law?
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, what would be
the international legal consequences in that case for each of those States,
and, possibly, for third States? 7 °
Due to the reputation of the International Court of Justice, there can be no
doubt that such an advisory opinion would be of enormous substantial weight.
o The question whether to request an advisory opinion is still pending in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. However, at the forty-ninth session,
the committee did not hold a debate on this item and decided to defer its con17
sideration to a "future session.' 1
2. Evaluation
The reactions of the various foreign states are of different character. Some of
them aim at the question of jurisdiction over abductees; others are concerned
about the equivocality of the Supreme Court's remark, "[riespondent and his
amici may be correct that respondent's abduction was ... in violation of general
international law principles."''
There might be cases where transborder
kidnappings are justified, 173 but not even the U.S. government seriously contested that Alvarez-Machain's abduction was a violation of international law. The
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Court, therefore, would have been well advised to state clearly that it did not
doubt the illegality of Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping.
A closer reading of the decision, however, would have revealed that the
Court did not proclaim a "right to kidnap." States who protested against the
judgment can be expected to have studied its holding carefully. The very narrow
interpretation of the extradition treaty with its overemphasis on the words of the
treaty was certainly questionable, 4 but not "monstrous."" 5 In fact, the
question of whether abduction constitutes a violation of the extradition treaty
was only in the domestic context of the Rauscber exception, and not of any significance. It is unlikely that foreign states would have been comparably outraged
by a decision holding that waging war did not violate extradition treaties as long
as no doubt is left that waging war is forbidden by customary international law
and numerous international treaties. 7" A spontaneous outcry about the decision might be understood as traditional resistance against a perceived U.S.
predominance in the Americas." Most states, however, have been more interested in clarifying the legal issue than bashing the United States.
The declarations and actions taken after the decision really seem to insist on
the legal question: "May another state enjoy the fruits of its breach of international law?" Apparently, the states who have protested and requested advisory
opinions from the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the International
Court of Justice answer this question in the negative. Their explicit rejection of
the Alvarez-Macbain decision even limits their own leeway for future action. For
instance, Mexico and Canada would be confronted with an estoppel argument178 if they kidnapped persons from the United States and claimed that they
had jurisdiction over them. The real point of the dispute which has developed in
the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain is, therefore, the question of jurisdiction and
not so much the narrower question of a violation of the extradition treaty. The
latter question solely seems to be the means to reject jurisdiction. Thus, the state

174. See Paul Hoffman, et al, Kidnapping Foreign Criminal Suspects, 15 Whittier L Rev
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reactions in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain are clear evidence that jurisdiction
over abductees is, in general, prohibited by customary international law.
III. Conclusion
Professor von Glahn wrote in 1992:
This principle is supported by the laws of the overwhelming number of all
states; once a prisoner is under the authority of a given court and has been
properly charged in accordance with the local law, he may be tried and, if
convicted, sentenced by that court regardless of the mode by which he was
brought originally under the authority of that court. 7 "
This statement is no longer true. Most national courts inquire into the circumstances of the apprehension of alleged offenders and decline jurisdiction in cases
of forcible abduction from abroad. The strong reactions of states in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain confirm this trend. States do not want other states to
enjoy the fruits of illegal conduct. In order to become a rule of customary
international law, the relevant practices, such as those reviewed in this article,
may be of comparatively short duration, but they must be general and consistent. 8 ' The speed can increase to such an extent that binding law comes into
being more quickly by way of custom than by way of a treaty.' A practice
can be general even if it is not universally followed. It should, however, reflect
wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.-'82 These requirements arguably have been met to create a customary rule of
international law in the kidnapping cases. Even though the precise contours of
this new rule might still be questionable, the principle that courts must look into
the circumstances under which a defendant was apprehended before exercising
jurisdiction over him seems to have passed the threshold of a legally binding
norm of customary international law.
In 1934, the U.S. Supreme Court had to determine the boundary in the
Delaware river and bay. 8 3 Justice Cardozo who delivered the opinion of the
Court, admitted:
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International law, or the law that governs between states, has at times, like
the common law within states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly
distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a
court attests its jural quality."8 4
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, international
organizations, foreign courts, and foreign governments responded by articulating
rules of individual state practice that together have moved beyond an amorphous
sense of "morality or justice," and closer to a well-established customary rule of
international law which contradicts the exercise of jurisdiction in AlvarezMachain. It is likely that the question of jurisdiction over abductees will continue
to arise and be further developed in international law. Eventually, an international tribunal is apt to articulate authoritatively the new rule of international law
that has developed in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain. Indeed, as pressure
increases on the United Nations to call to account major suspects of serious war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia, we may find the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal
called upon to establish our new rule."'5

184. Id at 383.
185. Even if the kidnapping of indicted war criminals were justified, the Court would
probably have to spell out the general rule on the question of whether an abduction in
violation of international law excludes a subsequent trial before defining exceptions to this
rule.
The Statute of the Tribunal contains no explicit provisions for obtaining custody of
the accused, 32 Intl Legal Mat 1145, 1192 (1993). Article 20 of the Statute provides in
pertinent part:
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with
full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of
victims and witnesses.
2. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall, pursuant to an
order or an arrest warrant of the International Tribunal, be taken into custody,
immediately informed of the charges against him and transferred to the International
Tribunal.
3. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the
accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for

trial.

The Secretary-General's report indicates that "it is axiomatic that the International
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), UN SCOR, 48th Sess at 9, UN Doc S/25704 (1993), UN SCOR,
48th Sess, revised by UN Doc S/25704/Corr 1 (1993), para 106. The report possibly
addresses concerns such as the possibility that United Nations personnel may abduct
accused individuals and deliver them to the Tribunal. See Karl Arthur Hochkammer, Note,

The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics, and International
Law, 28 Vand J Transnad L 119, 153 (1995).

